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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Santiago R. Burrola appeals from the district court's order denying his Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.

Mr. Burrola contends that the Idaho

Supreme Court violated his due process and equal protection rights when it refused to
augment the record with the transcript of the sentencing hearing that took place on
September 8, 2008, despite the fact that the grounds of the appeal demonstrate a
colorable need for the inclusion of the transcript. Further, Mr. Burrola contends that the
district court abused its discretion when it did not consider additional information
provided by Mr. Burrola in his Second Addendum to his Rule 35 motion.

Finally,

Mr. Burrola contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35
motion.
Mr. Burrola requests that this Court grant him access to the requested transcript
and allow him the opportunity to file supplemental briefing once the record is complete.
Should this Court deny Mr. Burrola's request for the sentencing transcript, Mr. Burrola
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order denying
Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion and remand the case to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing with an order to consider the supplemental information in its Rule 35
determination, or, alternatively, reduce Mr. Burrola's sentence as it deems appropriate.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 5, 2008, Mr. Burrola slapped his girlfriend during an altercation.
(R., pp.32-33.)

He pleaded guilty to Domestic Violence in the Presence of Children.

(R., pp.58-64.) The district court accepted Mr. Burrola's guilty plea and sentenced him
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to 10 years, with 2 years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., p.69.) On February 11,
2009, following a successful rider, the court placed Mr. Burrola on probation.
(R., pp.78-81.) On December 27, 2011, Mr. Burrola admitted to violating his probation
by not attending his classes, not obeying his probation officer's order to not engage in a
sexual relationship or spend time with any parolees or probationers, and using
marijuana.

(R., pp.111-114, 116.)

On January 11, 2012, the court revoked

Mr. Burrola's probation, but then reinstated probation.

(R., pp.118-120.)

On

December 18, 2012, Mr. Burrola admitted to violating his probation by failing to
complete his aftercare program, possessing alcohol, and absconding from probation.
(R., pp.124-127, 140.) On January 29, 3013, the court revoked Mr. Burrola's probation
and executed the original sentence of 10 years, with 2 years fixed. (R., pp.142-144.)
On February 1, 2013, Mr. Burrola filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 for a
reduction

of sentence and

requested

leave to file

supplemental

information.

(R., pp.145-146.) On February 4, 2013, the court filed a notice of intent to rule on the
Rule 35 motion on or about February 12, 2014. (R., pp.147-148.) On February 5, 2014,
Mr. Burrola filed an Addendum to his Rule 35 motion that included positive progress
reports from his Pathways domestic violence counseling program.

(R., pp.149-162.)

On February 14, 2013, Mr. Burrola filed a Motion to Enlarge Time so that he could file
additional documentation in support of his Rule 35 motion that would not be available
for approximately six weeks. (R., pp.163-134.) The court granted in part and denied in
part the Motion to Enlarge Time, giving Mr. Burrola until February 22, 2013 to provide
additional information, stating it would make a ruling on or after that date. (R., pp.165167.) However, the court did not rule on the Rule 35 motion on or around February 22,
2013. On July 19, 2013, Mr. Burrola filed a Second Addendum to his rule 35 motion,
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providing three letters of support from his family members and a letter from Collin
Young, an IDOC addictions treatment counselor, explaining that Mr. Burrola was
enrolled in Anger Management, Partners in Parenting, Getting Motivated to Change,
and was on the waiting list for Therapeutic Community. (R., pp.168-176.) On July 26,
2013, the court denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion, stating that it did not consider the
information provided in Mr. Burrola's Second Addendum to his Rule 35 motion because
it was not filed prior to February 22, 2013.

(R., pp.177-179.)

Mr. Burrola timely

appealed from the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.180-182.)
On December 26, 2013, Mr. Burrola filed a Motion to Augment the Record to
include the transcripts of the original sentencing hearing that occurred on September 3,
2008 and a subsequent disposition hearing. 1 (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment.))2
In his Motion to Augment, Mr. Burrola stated that the sentencing hearing transcript was
necessary to complete the record because Mr. Burrola made a statement at this hearing
that the court when considered it imposed the original sentence. (Motion to Augment,
pp.2-4.) Mr. Burrola further stated that the minute order from the sentencing hearing
was insufficient to establish an adequate record because it only stated that Mr. Burrola
made "comments" following counsel's sentencing recommendations.

(Motion to

Augment, p.3, R., p.141.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Burrola's Motion to

1

Mr. Burrola is not challenging the denial of his request for the transcript of the
dispositional hearing held on January 29, 2013 in this appeal.
2 The Motion to Augment the Record to include the Motion to Augment and to Suspend
the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof has been filed
contemporaneously with this brief.
3

Augment on January 31, 2014. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment.)3

3

The Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule has
been filed contemporaneously with this brief.
4

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court violate Mr. Burrola's rights to due process and
equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record with the
September 3, 2008 sentencing hearing transcript that is necessary for appellate
review of his Rule 35 motion?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it refused to consider
supplemental information provided by Mr. Burrola in his Second Addendum to his
Rule 35 motion?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35
motion in light of the supplemental information provided in his original Addendum
to his Rule 35 motion?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Mr. Burrola's Rights To Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The September 3,
2008 Sentencing Transcript That Is Necessary For Appellate Review Of His Rule 35
Motion
In order to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion, Mr. Burrola must show that the sentence was "excessive
in view of new or additional information presented with his motion for reduction."
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117 (Ct. App. 1991). The phrase "new or additional

information" naturally begs the question of to what prior information the information is
new or additional. While most of the information considered by the sentencing court is
available in the record, such as the PSI and any attached documents, any testimony
presented at the sentencing hearing would not be in the record unless it is stated in the
minute order. As such, if the minute order shows that testimony was presented by the
defendant, victim, or other witnesses without providing information about the content of
the testimony, a transcript is necessary to provide the reviewing court with an adequate
record on appeal.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered circumstances under which
indigent defendants are entitled to transcripts prepared at state expense on appeal.
State v. Brunet, _

Idaho _ , 2013 WL 6001894 (2013), reh'g denied. The Court

recognized that there is a federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to
provide transcripts sufficient for an adequate appellate review.

See id. (citing

Mayerv. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,
462 (2002)).

These requirements are part of the guarantees in the United States

Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall

6

have due process and equal protection under the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 13.

Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be

"fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991). Those same standards have been
applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.

Maresh v. State, Dep't of

Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed, in the context of due process
and equal protection, the question of whether transcripts must be provided to indigent
defendants.

See,

e.g.,

Griffin

v.

Illinois,

351

U.S.

12,

18-20

(1956);

Draperv. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963); Mayer, supra, 404 U.S. at 195.
The United States Supreme Court determined that if a state chooses to provide a
process for granting appellate review, the requirements of due process and equal
protection apply.

Griffin, supra, 351 U.S. at 18.

It follows, therefore, that if a state

provides its citizens with an appellate process, it must also provide indigent defendants
with the tools necessary to establish a proper appellate record. By not doing so, the
court is depriving an indigent defendant of his right to an effective appeal. See Lane v.

Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is "constitutionally invalid ... to
prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal") (emphasis added).
In Idaho, the requirement that the court must provide an indigent defendant with
the transcripts necessary to establish an adequate record on appeal is further justified
by the fact that items missing from the record on appeal are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court. State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also

State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 751, 805 (2000) (applying this presumption in absence of a
complete record). Therefore, if a defendant does not provide the appellate court with
7

the transcripts necessary to review his claim, the missing record will be presumed to
support the court's decision that is being challenged on appeal. It would be illogical for
the Court to place an appellant in such an obvious catch-22 by denying him access to
the transcripts that support his position, then finding that the absence of the transcripts
creates a presumption that the transcripts would not support his position. It is clear,
therefore, that a court must provide the transcripts necessary for an indigent defendant
to launch an effective appeal.

The only question remaining is the standard for

determining what transcripts are necessary for establishing an adequate record.
Given this landscape, the Idaho Supreme Court in Brunet held that, in order to
show that the transcript requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the
party moving for its inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the
additional transcripts." Brunet, supra, _Idaho_, 2013 WL 6001894. The Court
reasoned that a defendant's right to an adequate record did not extend to "fishing
expeditions" and "mere speculation or hope that something exists does not amount to
the appearance or semblance of specific information necessary to establish a colorable
need." Id (paraphrasing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 211 (1970) ("in
legal usage, the word 'color,' as in 'color of authority,' 'color of law,' 'color of office,'
'color of title,' and 'colorable,' suggests a kind of holding out and means 'appearance,
semblance, or simulacrum,' but not necessarily the reality").
Here, the facts regarding the request for the sentencing transcript can be
distinguished from those in Brunet. In Brunet, the Court held that the defendant "failed
to demonstrate a colorable need for those requested transcripts in light of the contents
of the existing record on appeal." Brunet, supra, _

Idaho_, 2013 WL 6001894.

The Court further determined that the defendant in Brunet had not stated what specific
8

information was relevant to his appeal and, rather, "articulated a desire to procure the
transcripts to then search the transcripts for a reason to request and incorporate the
transcripts in the first place." Id. In contrast, Mr. Burrola specifically stated not only the
reason why he requires the information contained in the sentencing transcript, but also
why the existing record is insufficient to provide this information. (Motion to Augment,
p.3.) In his Motion to Augment, Mr. Burrola clearly stated that the subject of his appeal
was the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (Motion to Augment, p.2.) As discussed above, in
order to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Burrola's
Rule 35 motion, Mr. Burrola must show that the sentence was "excessive in view of new
or additional information presented with his motion for reduction." Hernandez, supra,
121 Idaho at 117. Since the sentence to which Mr. Burrola is objecting is the sentence
that was imposed at the sentencing hearing, the information presented in his Rule 35
motion must be new or additional to the information that was presented at the original
sentencing hearing.

The information at the original sentencing hearing would, of

course, include the PSI and its accompanying information, any additional documents
provided to the court at the hearing, and any testimony provided by the victim,
Mr. Burrola, or any other witnesses at the hearing. While the arguments of counsel,
unless they provide new information, would not constitute evidence, the testimony of a
defendant at sentencing is evidence that the court must consider. See State v. Gervasi,
138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003) (determining that when a defendant makes a
statement of allocution at a sentencing hearing, those comments are relevant to the
sentencing determination), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho
882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied.
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The statement made by Mr. Burrola at his sentencing hearing is only articulated
in two places: the minute order and the reporter's transcript. Had the minute order from
the sentencing hearing stated that no testimony or additional information was provided,
a transcript might not be necessary. Had the minute order shown redundancy - e.g.
"defendant read his statement verbatim from the PSI" - the transcript might not be
necessary.

However, the minute order states that Mr. Burrola made "comments."

(R., p.141.) The word "comments" certainly does not convey the testimony that was

presented by Mr. Burrola at his sentencing hearing and the State has not established
that there is an alternative option for determining what was said, as is its burden.

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971) (holding that "where the grounds of
appeal [ ... ] make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the
State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an
effective appeal on those grounds"). Here, the minute order is so limited that it cannot
possibly substitute for a transcript. While it is possible that, following the sentencing
recommendations by counsel, Mr. Burrola merely commented on the weather, it is much
more reasonable to conclude that Mr. Burrola's "comments" pertained to his sentence.
Further, as discussed below, Mr. Burrola presented evidence in his Rule 35 motion that
he took full responsibility for his crime in his domestic violence classes. (R., pp.151162.) Idaho courts have recognized that some leniency is required when a defendant
expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. See, e.g.,

State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209
(Ct. App. 1991).

Because the minute order does not describe the content of

Mr. Burrola's testimony at his sentencing hearing, it is unknown whether he took full
responsibility for his crime at sentencing or whether he blamed others. Therefore, the
10

question of whether the fact that Mr. Burrola took responsibility for his crime is a new
mitigating factor can only be answered by reviewing a transcript of the sentencing
hearing.
Obviously, Mr. Burrola is not required, in his Motion to Augment, to state
specifically what was said at the sentencing hearing because such detail would require
reviewing the transcript that is being requested.

The Court in its decision in Brunet

could not have intended to place an indigent defendant in such a paradoxical situation.
Mr. Burrola provided the Court with the minute order clearly showing that he presented
testimony on his own behalf at his sentencing hearing.

Such a showing meets the

Brunet standard of an "appearance or semblance of specific information."

The statement made by Mr. Burrola at his sentencing hearing is necessary for
appellate review of the denial of his Rule 35 motion. To determine whether the district
court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion, "this Court
conducts an independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment."
State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)) (emphasis added).

Brunet at 4 (citing

A statement made by a

defendant at his sentencing hearing is clearly evidence that was available to the trial
court, and must, therefore, be made available to the reviewing court.

Therefore,

because Mr. Burrola presented evidence at his sentencing hearing in the form of
testimony, there is a colorable need for the transcript of the September 3, 2008
sentencing hearing to be augmented to the record.

As such, the Idaho Supreme

Court's decision to deny Mr. Burrola's request to augment the record with that transcript
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Consider The
Supplemental Information Provided By Mr. Burrola In His Second Addendum To His
Rule 35 Motion
Prior to the district court's decision on the Rule 35 motion, Mr. Burrola provided
additional information for the court to consider.

The court's refusal to consider this

information was unreasonable in light of the fact that the court had not yet ruled on the
Rule 35 motion and did not actually render a decision until a week later. (R., pp.177178.)
A court abuses its discretion at sentencing when it unreasonably refuses to
consider relevant evidence or unduly limits the information considered.

See, e.g.,

State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984) (court abused its discretion when it

failed to consider social worker's report when it decided defendant's Rule 35 motion);
State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 582 (Ct. App. 1988) (court abused its discretion

when it refused to hear proffered testimony from jail staff regarding defendant's good
behavior or from relatives concerning the defendant's alcohol problem and possibility of
treatment when it decided defendant's Rule 35 motion); compare State v. Ramirez, 122
Idaho 830, 836 (Ct. App. 1992) (court did not unduly limit the information it considered
on a Rule 35 motion when it refused to conduct a hearing that would allow the
defendant to present testimony when defendant could not identify what information he
might have produced).
Here, unlike in Ramirez, the court already had the information that it refused to
consider. The court stated that it did not consider the new information because it was
not received by the date on which the court said it was going to rule on the motion.
(R., pp.177-178.)

However, the court did not rule on the motion on that date, and
12

therefore, the court unduly limited the available information that it considered. The court
did not present a single explanation for excluding the supplemental information other
that the fact that it "could have made a ruling on the motion" prior to the receipt of the
information. (R., p.178.) The supplemental information constituted a total of six pages
and was not burdensome for the court to read.

(R., pp.170-176.) Letters of support

from family members and proof of enrollment in treatment programs are clearly relevant
to sentencing.

As such, the court's decision to not consider this information was

unreasonable and, therefore, an abuse of discretion.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 Motion In
Light Of The Supplemental Information Provided In His Original Addendum To His
Rule 35 Motion
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to consider the
supplemental information that Mr. Burrola provided in his Second Addendum to his Rule
35 motion, the court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Burrola's Rule 35 motion in
light of the new and additional information that it did review.
An otherwise lawful sentence may be altered under Rule 35 if the sentence
originally imposed was unduly severe."
(Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Trent, supra, 125 Idaho 251, 253

Even if the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, a

defendant can prevail on a Rule 35 motion if the sentence is excessive in view of new or
additional information presented with the motion for reduction.

Id. "The criteria for

examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id. In order to challenge
the denial of a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must have presented new or additional
information with the motion for reduction. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
13

Mr. Burrola asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 10
years, with 2 years fixed, was excessive in light of the new information he provided in
his Rule 35 motion. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of
the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771,
772 (Ct. App. 1982). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is
within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of
discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Burrola does
not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to
show an abuse of discretion, he must show that in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
Here,

Mr.

Burrola

provided

the

court with

progress

Pathways Program from September 2009 through July 2010.

reports

from

his

(R., pp.151-162.) The

reports were extremely positive and showed that Mr. Burrola took his domestic violence
classes seriously. Prior to these classes, Mr. Burrola had never received treatment for
drug and alcohol abuse or for domestic violence.
Report, p.15, 2008 PSI generally.)

(2008 Presentence Investigation

The reports state that Mr. Burrola had excellent

empathy and concern, that he gave and received feedback thoughtfully, that he
completed all of his homework assignments with evidence of thought and effort, he was
14

attentive and took notes during presentations, and that he "took responsibility for his
crime 100%." (R., pp.151-162.) One facilitator, Deby Stace, said that "it is apparent
that [Mr. Burrola] is cognitively taking the material in and is contemplating how to apply
the material."

(R., pp.156.)

There is not a single negative statement regarding

Mr. Burrola's progress in nearly a year of domestic violence counseling. (R., pp.151162.) Although Mr. Burrola later admitted to violating his probation, it should be noted
that none of the allegations in either of his probation violations involved violence or
domestic dispute of any kind.

(R., pp.111-113, 124-126.)

These classes had not

occurred at the time of sentencing and, therefore, these reports were not available to
the district court when it imposed Mr. Burrola's original sentence.

Clearly, Mr. Burrola

learned from the classes and, as such, presents much less of a danger to the public
than he did when he was first sentenced. His progress also shows his amenability to
rehabilitation.

Mr. Burrola may not have been perfect on probation, but he made

progress, as evidenced by the reports, and the court abused its discretion by not
reducing his underlying sentence when it revoked probation.

15

CONCLUSION
Mr. Burrola respectfully requests access to the transcript of the sentencing
hearing and the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing once the
record is complete. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Burrola respectfully requests
that this Court vacate the order denying his Rule 35 motion and remand this case with
an order that the court consider the improperly excluded information. Alternatively, he
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014.

KIMBERLY
SMITH
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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